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ABSTRACT
In this paper we consider the modern theory of the Bayesian brain
from cognitive neurosciences in the light of recommender systems
and expose potentials for our community. In particular, we elabo-
rate on noisy user feedback and the thus resulting multicomponent
user models, which have indeed a biological origin. In real user
experiments we observe the impact of both factors directly in a re-
peated rating task along with recommendation. As a consequence,
this contribution supports the plausibility of contemporary theo-
ries of mind in the context of recommender systems and can be
understood as a solicitation to integrate ideas of cognitive neuro-
sciences into our systems in order to further improve the prediction
of human behaviour.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In our community of recommender systems, there are continual
eorts to make predictions more precise and systems more ecient
and user-friendly. In doing so, the classic approach is to model the
relationship between a user and items in terms of optimising a target
function in order to predict future user decisions based on training
data. However, there are two major problems that are caused by
human nature. First of all, many studies prove that users are not
entirely certain about a decision so that a given rating may uctuate
when the rating task is repeated (noisy user feedback) [1, 2, 8, 10].
Second, optimising a target function might not suciently account
for dynamic changes in behaviour (need for multicomponent user
models) which again can be proven in systematic user experiments
[13]. e theories of cognitive neurosciences know these phenom-
ena and describe these aspects of human cognition by means of
probabilistic models. For example, the origin of volatile decision-
making and noisy user feedback is due to the irregular transmission
of informations through the synaptic cle. A Bayesian formula-
tion of this eect leads directly to multicomponent models as an
explicit consequence of user noise. Both of these factors, noisy user
feedback and multicomponent models, have recently been proven
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Figure 1: Hierarchical message passing through cortex layers.
to have a signicant impact on prediction quality in recommender
systems [1, 9, 12]. erefore, this contributions seeks the benets
of implementing neuroscientic models and will give experimental
indication for possible deciencies within the eld of recommender
research in case of omission.
2 THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
e Bayesian brain theory is a composition of Bayesian inference
and theoretical neurology. We will rst demonstrate similarity to
Bayesian recommender systems and then discuss the modelling of
noisy data as well as multicomponent user models.
Bayesian Learning Basics
From the perspective of cognitive neuroscience, it all starts with the
brain observing sensory input Y (visual, auditory, etc.) and making
an estimate of the state of the worldX [3]. To continiously improve
this estimation - or subjective beliefs to be more precisely - the
brain has to learn by comparing reality against predictions based
on these beliefs [5]. is makes the human brain a highly sophisti-
cated recommender system itself. e Bayes eorem provides the
basis for the processing of beliefs along with real world evidence.
ose conrmed or modied beliefs are thereby brought to ever
new situations. Mathematically spoken, the posterior serves as
prior in subsequent cognitions. For multiple independent sensory
observations y = (y1, . . . ,yn ) we yield
P(X |y) ∝ P(X |y1) · . . . · P(X |yt−1) · P(X |yt ) (1)
where
∏t−1
i=1 P(X |yi ) is the posterior of X given sensory data until
time t − 1 and serves as prior for time t (learning from the past).
When the world state itself changes while making observations, we
need to consider a transition probabilities P(Xt |Xt−1)
P(X |y) ∝ P(Xt |Xt−1) ·
t−1∏
i=1
P(Xt−1 |yi ) · P(X |yt ) (2)
which is the basis of learning by iteration. Here, we can already
see the similarity to Bayesian recommender systems clearly [11].
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Figure 2: Example of variable responses to the same item
But how does the brain actually model prior probabilities? Mathe-
matically, this question is pointless when hierarchical networks are
used since these models optimise the priors themselves through
mutual back-propagation of predictions and forward-feeding of
prediction errors [5] as to see in Figure 1. e optimisation task
itself is done by neuron clusters (agents) via minimising the so
called free energy [5]. In consequence, beliefs do exist in the form
of probability densities, from which particular draws are made for
decision making. We will see later that these distributions indeed
exist in the case of product ratings.
Neural Noise and Decision-Making
Message passing works by relaying electrical signals from one
neuron to the next through the synaptic gap by means of neuro-
transmiers. However, same signals never result into emiing the
same amount of transmiers (neural noise) [4–6, 15]. is noise
may raise too weak (or sucient) signals above (or below) a cer-
tain threshold, causing a neuron to inhibit (or to re) [3]. In fact,
for the ring of a neuron, we can only specify a probability [3, 7].
In a recommender’s language, biological irregularity implies that
every time a decision-making is repeated, other prior probabilities
might be used and thus the resulting belief is never quite the same
as before. In a systematic experiment, real users repeatedly rated
theatrical trailers on a 5-star scale. It turns out that only 35% of all
users show constant rating behaviour, whereas about 50% use two
dierent answer categories and 15% of all users make use of three
or more categories. Figure 2 is a characteristic example for these re-
sults. is sows that individuals are not able to perfectly reproduce
their decision-making. ese uctuations can be explained by the
theory of neural noise, and have a direct eect on recommender
systems. Assuming the model based prediction to be pi = 3, a user
rating r = 4 can not be seen as a deviation according to Figure
2. Furthermore, by gathering information about temporary belief
posteriors [14], it can be proven that all user responses (aggregated
for each item) hold the same expectation. is is an indication
for a common source of noise with constant magnitude, i.e. the
manifestation of neural noise.
Modelling User Preferences
When it comes to a repeated product rating where the participant
does not remember his previous response, as induced in our con-
trolled experiment, the process of decision making is restarted.
Accordingly, the participant receives a new and slightly dierent
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Figure 3: Precision of 3 recommender systems
belief distribution for each rating trial. is has been mathemat-
ically explained in [6] and implies the need for multicomponent
user models, which have recently been adressed in recommender
systems research [9, 13]. Figure 3 shows the RMSEs of three dier-
ent systems utilised in our experiment, based on one-component
models along with the scores each system has achieved in each trial.
It is apparent that some draws (scores) can not be drawn from the
corresponding distribution. is indicates that users had changed
their rating behaviour and sampled from dierent distributions for
dierent trials. It can be proven via hypothesis testing that rating
behaviour of trial 1 and 5 signicantly deviates from trials 2 to 4.
is can be explained by memory eects: In trial 1, decision-making
was initialised for the rst time. Aer the trial 2, participants got
aware that the experiment was about repetition and so started to
remember their ratings. erefore, belief distributions remained
more or less the same. Aer the trial 4 plus constant addition of new
distractors, short-time memory was not able to keep all previous
information and further decision-making produced dierent belief
distributions again. ese ndings within simple recommendation
scenarios can be entirely described by the Bayesian brain theory
and may help systems to learn human behaviour more naturally.
3 CONCLUSION
We have shown that the Bayesian brain theory uses the same mod-
els as Bayesian recommender systems. In addition, we have shown
that the Bayesian brain theory is already in a position to model
quantities whose impact can be seen in recommendation scenarios.
We have demonstrated this by the example of noisy user feedback
and multicomponent models. e impact of these factors has been
discussed briey, i.e. the interpretation of correct and false predic-
tions has to be considered more dierentiated whereas the choice
of user models holds a strong dependency on time. We therefore
recommend to adopt corresponding models from neurosciences
in order to optimise recommender systems in terms of imitating
human behaviour.
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